The mischief rule of interpretation originated from the Heydon’s Case
Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637
Ottery College, a religious college, gave tenancy in a menor to Ware and his son. The tenancy was established by copyhold. The Ware’s copyhold was part of a parcel also occupied by some tenants at will. The college leased the same parcel to another man named Heydon for a period of 8 years in return of rents equal to the traditional rent for the components of the parcel. Less than a year after the parcel was leased to Heydon, the Parliament enacted Suppression of Religious Houses Act, 1535. The statute had the effect of dissolving many religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost its lands and rents to Henry VIII. However, a provision of the Act kept in force any grants that had been made more than a year before the enactment of the Statute.
The Court of Exchequer resolved, for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, four things are to be discerned and considered:-
- What was the common law before making of the Act.
- What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide
- What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
- The true reason for the remedy.
And then the judges shall make such construction that would suppress the mischief and subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and advance the remedy and add force and life to the cure of the remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act.
Accordingly, the Court of Exchequer found that the grant of Wares was protected under the Act, but the lease of Heydon had become void.
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India [AIR 1957 SC 628]
The Parliament enacted the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. The petitioner contended that the provisions laid down in the Act, and Rules made thereunder, encroached upon the fundamental rights to carry on business guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) and that it amounted to prohibition and not merely a regulation. Moreover, S.2(d) that defined Prize Competition not only included Competitions in which success rate was depended upon chance but also those in which success rate was depended upon substantial degree of skill and, therefore, the impugned law constituted a single, inseverable enactment, it must fail in its entirety.
The Supreme Court held that S. 2(d) should be construed keeping in mind the historical background of the Act and the mischief it intends to suppress. Keeping these factors in mind, it is clear that the legislation was enacted to regulate and control prize competitions of gambling nature. The use of word control would not have been appropriate if it was intended towards competition of skill. Therefore, the competitions which were intended to be controlled and regulated under the Act were only those in which success does not depend upon any substantial degree of skill.
Smith v. Hughes (1960) 1 WLR 830
The question that arose in this case was whether prostituted who attracted prospective customers from balconies or windows were soliciting ‘in a street’ as provided under Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. Applying the mischief rule it was held that they were in fact soliciting ‘in a street’ and thus the place from where they were doing so was of no consequence because the Act was intended to clean up the streets to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by prostitutes.
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